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The Grease in the Gears: Impunity in the
Democratic Republic of Congo and the
Opportunity for Peace
JAKE GOODMAN
I. INTRODUCrION
The ongoing war in the Democratic Republic of Congo' is the
deadliest conflict since World War II, and the world's deadliest
humanitarian crisis. 2 Between 1998 and 2008, 5.4 million people
died from war-related causes-most from easily preventable
diseases and malnutrition rather than direct acts of violence-as
the state struggled to provide basic security. Rebel groups and the
Congolese army continue to wreak havoc in the eastern Congo,
despite a comprehensive peace agreement, the establishment of a
democratically elected government that improved security in many
portions of the country, and the encouraging of cooperation
between the Rwandan and Congolese governments. Prospects for
a lasting peace remain doubtful.
* International Policy Fellow, Human Rights First; J.D. Georgetown University Law
Center, 2009, B.A. Rutgers University, 2005. This article reflects my own personal views
and not necessarily those of Human Rights First. This article is current through August
2009. I am very grateful to Professors Jane Stromseth, Jonathan Drimmer, arid Russell
Goodman for their invaluable guidance on earlier drafts. My deepest thanks to Anne,
Russell, Elizabeth, and Ruth Goodman for their unfailing support and encouragement.
1. The Democratic Republic of Congo is alternatively referred to as the "DRC" or
"Congo" throughout this paper.
2. INT'L RESCUE COMM., MORTALITY IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO:
AN ONGOING CRISIS ii (2008), available at http://www.theirc.org/resources/2007/2006-
7_congomortalitysurvey.pdf; Benjamin Coughlan et al., Mortality in the Democratic
Republic of Congo: A Nationwide Survey, 367 THE LANCET 44 (2006).
3. INT'L RESCUE COMM., supra note 2, at ii-iii.
4. DR Congo: 100,000 Civilians at Risk of Attack, HUM. RTS. WATCH, Apr. 29,2009,
http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2009/04/29/dr-congo-100000-civiians-risk-attack.
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In addition to the staggering number of deaths, the war in the
Congo has produced horrific human rights abuses.' The price paid
for the comprehensive peace agreement was impunity for those
most responsible for the atrocities. Rather than risk derailing the
shaky peace process by aggressively prosecuting human rights
abusers, the strategy of the transition was to purchase stability by
distributing lucrative and powerful government positions to armed
groups, regardless of their human rights records. In this way, "in
the words of one human rights worker in Kinshasa, 'impunity
greased the gears of the transition.'"
In the broader debate about the proper balance of peace and
justice in conflict settings, the DRC is a case study of the possible
consequences of prioritizing peace over justice. This paper traces
the history of impunity in the peace process, and argues that
several powerful factors contributed to the low priority given to
justice in the DRC's transition. While the peace agreement
produced favorable results in the short term, its strategy of
appeasement and impunity for human rights violators is unlikely to
produce long-term peace, and should be abandoned. Rather than
threatening the peace process, ending the culture of impunity is a
necessary and positive contribution to it. The arrest and trial
before the International Criminal Court ("ICC") of prominent
rebel leaders in the Kivus, the epicenter of the conflict today,
would be a valuable and necessary step in paving the way for long-
term peace.
In developing this argument, this paper first sets the peace
process in context by providing a brief outline of the conflict's
background in Part II. Part III then analyzes the transitional
government's substance and structure, concluding that justice was
deemphasized in the peace and transition, while Part IV posits
four interwoven factors that explain the low priority given to
justice. Part V analyzes the legacy of the transition, arguing that
continuing the strategy of appeasement and high-level government
appointments, with impunity for human rights violations, will
doom the DRC to eternal conflict. Finally, Part VI focuses on the
5. Reducing the enormous literature on human rights abuses in the Congo to a
single list here would be of limited use. Instead, I will refer to particular reports
throughout the paper as they become relevant.
6. Jason K. Stearns, Congo's Peace: Miracle or Mirage?, 106 CURRENT HIST. 202,
205 (2007), available at http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=4799&=1.
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conflict in the eastern Congo, and argues that piercing the armor
of impunity through the arrest and trial of prominent rebels in the
area would be a necessary and positive contribution to a lasting
peace. The article also suggests the ICC as a possible. vehicle for
imposing this accountability.
II. THE CONFLICr IN THE CONGO
The conflict in the Congo is exceptionally complicated, and a
thorough analysis of the current crisis's context is beyond the
scope of this paper. Instead, this section will provide a history of
the conflict through the Final Act of the inter-Congolese dialogue
in 2003, as background for the discussion of more recent history of
the conflict and the role of international criminal law in the peace
process that follows.
The DRC has been in a state of conflict, with only occasional
respite, since the overthrow of Mobutu Sese Seko in May of 1997.
Following thirty-two years of brutal and exceedingly corrupt
dictatorship,' a coalition of nations led -principally by Rwanda and
Uganda,8 backed a rebel invasion that toppled the Mobutu regime
and installed Laurent Kabila, a Congolese citizen from Katanga,9
as the head of state. Kabila quickly fell out of favor with his
Rwandan and Ugandan backers, each of whom re-invaded, setting
up proxy rebel groups throughout the country10 and threatening to
topple Kabila's nascent regime in Kinshasa." Only the timely
7. For a compelling study of the Congo under Mobutu, see generally MICHELA
WRONG, IN THE FOOTSTEPS OF MR. KURTZ: LIVING ON THE BRINK OF DISASTER IN
MOBUTU'S CONGO (HarperCollins Publishers 2001) (2000).
8. While there is some debate as to the particular roles that each of Kabila's
supporters played in the rebellion, there is a consensus among scholars that Rwanda and
to a lesser extent Uganda were deeply involved. See Stearns, supra note 6, at 202 (stating
that Kabila was materially supported by a coalition of Rwanda, Uganda, Angola, and
Eritrea); FEDERICO BORELLO, INT'L CTR. FOR TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, A FIRST FEW
STEPS: THE LONG ROAD TO A JUST PEACE IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE
CONGO vii (Oct. 2004) (stating that Rwanda and Uganda were Kabila's principal
supporters); THOMAS TURNER, THE CONGO WARS: CONFLICT, MYTH AND REALITY 5
(2007) (arguing that Rwanda had planned and directed the "so-called rebellion").
9. Katanga is one of ten provinces in the DRC.
10. TURNER, supra note 8, at 5-7. Rwanda and Uganda jointly created the
Rassemblement Congolais Pour La Democratie (RCD), but a struggle for control of the
RCD prompted Uganda to back its own rebel group, the Mouvement pour la Liberation
du Congo (MLC).
11. Howard W. French, Rebels Closing in on Blacked-Out Congo Capital, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 14, 1998, at Al.
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intervention of troops from Zimbabwe, Angola, and Namibia
prevented such an outcome.
While the intervention saved Kabila's regime, eight countries
were drawn into the conflict that quickly descended into a chaotic
stalemate-dubbed Africa's first world war-with a dizzying array
of motives and objectives pursued by each state involved. Non-
state actors, acting independently or with the secret support of one
of the states involved, further complicated the crisis. The
Rwandan-backed Rassemblement Congolais pour la Democratie
(RDC) and the Ugandan-backed Mouvement Pour la Liberation
du Congo (MLC) rebel groups exercised loose control over the
eastern and northern Congo respectively.14 Portions of each
faction splintered into a dozen marauding armed groups, with
constantly shifting allegiances and undefined objectives." As
outlined in several UN reports, all parties involved sought to
control and exploit the DRC's vast mineral wealth.16 The Lusaka
Ceasefire Agreement, optimistically signed in the summer of 1999,
proved toothless, and fighting resumed almost immediately with
each of the many parties accusing every other of violating the
vague terms of the agreement.17 It did, however, pave the way for
the United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo
(MONUC).'g Laurent Kabil, assassinated in January of 2001, was
succeeded by his son, Joseph Kabila, spurring new optimism for a
12. TURNER, supra note 8, at 6.
13. Ian Fisher & Norimitsu Onishi, Many Armies Ravage Rich Land in the 'First
World War' of Africa, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 2000, at 1.
14. Id.
15. Keith Somerville, DR Congo Awash with Rebels, BBC NEWS, July 23, 2002,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/2146537.stm.
16. Sanctions Urged for Congo Plunderers, BBC NEWS, Oct. 21, 2002,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/2345727.stm. For an authoritative analysis on the role
of mineral plunder in the Congo's conflict, see HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, THE CURSE OF
GOLD: DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO (2005) [hereinafter THE CURSE OF GOLD].
17. See INT'L CRISIS GROUP, AFRICA REPORT NO. 26, SCRAMBLE FOR THE CONGO:
ANATOMY OF AN UGLY WAR (Dec. 20, 2000). The Lusaka agreement relied exclusively
on the cooperation of the parties, with no independent organization to police, much less
enforce, its terms. The agreement reflected the international community's desire for a low-
cost solution to the conflict.
18. Security Council Resolution 1258, passed on August 6, 1999, authorized the
deployment of ninety military liaison officers to the state capitals of the parties, with a
mandate to provide technical assistance and information regarding the situation on the
ground to the Secretary General. S.C. Res. 1258, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1258 (Aug. 6, 1999).
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peaceful settlement of the conflict." In July, Rwanda pledged to
withdraw its troops in exchange for a crackdown on Hutu militias
in the Kivus.2 0 Uganda soon followed.2 1 In December 2002, a
fragile peace agreement, brokered mainly by South Africa,
followed a series of drawn out negotiations between the main
rebel groups and the Kabila government. The power sharing
agreement, reached on December 16, 2002, in Pretoria, paved the
way for the transitional government in June 2003.22 The Final Act
of the inter-Congolese dialogue, signed in April 2003, solidified the
23agreement and laid out the terms of the transition. This
agreement provided the framework for the peace process and
transition in the DRC.
III. THE TRANSITION
A. The Substance of the Transition Agreement
The power sharing agreement employed a realpolitik
approach to the conflict, privileging short-term cessation of
hostilities over a just and accountable peace that addressed the
underlying causes of violence. With only slight exception, to be
discussed below, accountability for the staggering human rights
atrocities committed throughout the conflict -was conspicuously
absent from the negotiations. The primary strategy employed at
the negotiations was to persuade each warring party to give up its
arms in exchange for extremely lucrative positions of power within
the newly formed transitional government.
19. Christopher S. Wren, Congo's New Leader, at the U.N., Pledges Talks With War
Foes, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3,2001, at A7.
20. Mark Lacey, Congo Peace Accord Evokes Cautious Hopes, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6,
2002, at A3.
21. Marc Lacey, Congo: Troubles Continue as Pullout Begins, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 30,
2002, at A8. Zimbabwe, Namibia, and Angola agreed to withdraw along with Uganda.
22. James Lamont, Power-Sharing Deal May End Congo War, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 18,
2002, at 12.
23. The Final Agreement comprised "the Global and All-Inclusive Agreement on the
Transition in the DRC, signed in December 2002 in Pretoria, the Transitional
Constitution, the Memorandum on Military and Security Issues of March 2003, and the 36
resolutions adopted by the inter-Congolese dialogue in April 2002." The Democratic
Republic of Congo Peace Accords: One Year Later: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Africa of the Comm. on Int'l Relations H.R., 108th Cong. 9 (2004) (statement of
Constance Barry Newman, Assistant Sec'y, Bureau of African Affairs, Dep't of State),
available at http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/archives/108/94990.pdf.
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The substance of the agreement makes plain the strategy of
the negotiating parties. Two key factors indicate the degree to
which justice and accountability were set aside in favor of
immediate peace: the prominent role given to reported human
rights abusers in the transitional government, and the weakness of
accountability measures written into the agreement. Each will be
examined in turn.
B. The Structure of the New Government
Under the Final Act, the Transitional Government was led by
President Joseph Kabila, supported by four vice presidents, known
as "Formula 1 + 4."24 The vice presidents were to come from the
various negotiating parties, and each was to run a particular
portion of the Transition. The Congolese Rally for Democracy
(RCD) would appoint a vice president in charge of the Political
Committee; the Movement for the Liberation of Congo (MLC)
would run the Economic and Finance Committee; Kabila's
government would appoint the vice president to run the
Committee for Reconstruction and Development; and the
legitimate political opposition would appoint a vice president to
run the Social and Cultural Committee. The agreement called for
thirty six ministers and twenty five vice ministers, as well as a 500
26member National Assembly and a 120 member Senate. All posts,
including those in the National Assembly and Senate, were made
by appointments divvied up among the parties to the agreement.
24. Thierry Kambere, Program Officer, Global Rights, Prospects for Justice in the
Democratic Republic of Congo: A Global Rights Discussion Forum, (Apr. 3, 2006)
(summary of remarks available at www.globalrights.org/ site/DocServer/ DRC April_06.
pdf? doclD=5023) [hereinafter Prospects for Justice].
25. Global and Inclusive Agreement on Transition in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo, at 7, Dec. 16, 2002, available at http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWFiles2004.nsf/
FilesByRWDocUNIDFileName/MHII-65G8B8-gov-cod-16dec-02.pdf/$File/gov-cod-
16dec-02.pdf [hereinafter Global and Inclusive Agreement].
26. Id. at 9,15-16.
27. "During the negotiation process, the government of the Republic was represented
by the former government led by President Joseph Kabila. Rebel groups were represented
by the Rwanda-backed Congolese Rally for Democracy (Rassemblement Congolais pour
la D6mocratie, RCD-Goma), the Uganda-backed Movement for the Liberation of Congo
(Mouvement pour la Lib6ration du Congo, MLC), the Congolese Rally for Democracy-
National (Rassemblement Congolais pour la D6mocratie-National (RCDN), the
Congolese Rally for Democracy/Kisangani-Liberation Movement(Rassemblement
Congolais pour la D6mocratie/Kisangani-Mouvement de Lib6ration, RCD/K-ML). Non-
armed political opposition parties were represented by the Union for Democracy and
[Vol. 32:209214
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These positions were to be held until national elections,
provisionally scheduled for 2005.28 The agreement put the main
rebel groups into positions of impressive power, while buying the
cooperation of potentially troublesome factions by elevating the
"smaller, auxiliary parties-political opposition groups, civil
society, and three small rebel movements-from minor players to
highranking positions."29 The Congo's vast mineral wealth assured
that all parties were extremely well-paid, 0 and the opportunity to
use newfound positions of power to spread wealth among each
constituency was plentiful. For example, each vice-president was
afforded $250,000 per month for himself and his staff, while
ministers and parliamentarians were afforded $4,000 and $1,500 a
month respectively." Directors of state-run companies, whose
appointments were shared among the signatories, made up to
32$20,000 a month. In this way, money and influence purchased
peace and the promise of a democratically elected government.
The human rights abuses of those promoted to positions of power
within the transitional government are well documented.33 As
Thierry Kambere, a Global Rights Program Officer in Kinshasa,
states, "'Formula 1+ 4' was the price for peace. It's bitter, but the
Social Progress (Union pour la D6mocratie et le Progrbs Social, UDPS), Unified
Lumumbist Party (Parti Lumumbiste Unifi6, PALU), National Congolese Movement-
Lumumba (Mouvement National Congolais-Lumumba, M.N.C./L), Popular Movement
for the Revolution-Fait Priv6 (Mouvement Populaire de la Revolution-Fait Priv6 (MPR-
Fait Priv6), Innovative Forces for Union and Solidarity (Forces Novatrices pour l'Union et
la Solidarit6, FONUS) and Democratic and Social Christian Party (Parti Social et
D6mocrate Chr6tien, PDSC)." Theodore Kasongo Kamwimbi, The DRC Elections,
Reconciliation and Justice, Pambazuka News, July 27, 2006,
http://www.pambazuka.org/en/category/features/36231/print.
28. Lamont, supra note 22.
29. See Stearns, supra note 6, at 202-03.
30. See THE CURSE OF GOLD, supra note 16, at 12-22.
31. Stearns, supra note 6, at 203.
32. Id.
33. The volume of literature documenting the human rights abuses is impressive. For
illustrative reporting, see generally Human Rights Watch, War Crimes in Kisangani: The
Response of Rwandan-Backed Rebels to the May 2002 Mutiny, 14 HuM. RTS. WATCH
(2002) No. 6(A), available at http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/DRC0802.pdf
[hereinafter War Crimes in Kisangani] (outlining specifically the abuses of top
commanders of the RCD); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, THE WAR WITHIN THE WAR:
SEXUAL VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AND GIRLS IN EASTERN CONGO (2002)
(describing abuses by all parties to the conflict); Amnesty Int'l, Democratic Republic of
Congo: Rwandese-Controlled East: Devastating Human Toll, Al Index AFR 62/011/2001,
June 19, 2001 [hereinafter Rwandese-Controlled East: Devastating Human Toll]
(describing human rights abuses by all parties in the eastern Congo).
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Congolese people must accept that perpetrators of crimes run the
country.", 4
C. The Weakness of the Accountability Measures
Though armed groups insisted an amnesty provision be
included in the Final Act, its terms left significant room for the
punishment of gross violations of human rights. The Final Act's
weakness in accountability, then, results from the inadequacy of
positive accountability measures, rather than from the amnesty
provision itself.
Rebel groups initially sought a blanket amnesty covering the
full spectrum of crimes, including war crimes and crimes against
humanity." However, the amnesty provision adopted in the Final
Act was limited, and did not cover egregious violations of human
36rights. It declared that "[t]o achieve national reconciliation,"
amnesty would be granted for "acts of war" and "political and
opinion breaches of the law."3 ' However, it explicitly excepted
from coverage genocide, war crimes, and crimes against
humanity. Despite criticism that the provision was insufficiently
specific to avoid abuse,39 leading human rights organizations have
characterized the wording as "clearly excluding all serious human
rights violations from the scope of the application of the amnesty
law." 40 The Final Act follows the best practices of amnesties in
peace negotiations, and is in line with international law forbidding
amnesty for war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide.
Though the amnesty provision provided room for
accountability for human rights violations, the Final Act lacked
any robust mechanism for prosecution of such violations. The sole
positive accountability measure contemplated by the parties was a
Truth and Reconciliation Commission. While truth and
34. Prospects for Justice, supra note 24.
35. LAURA DAVIS & PRISCILLA HAYNER, INT'L CTR. FOR TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE,
DIFFICULT PEACE, LIMITED JUSTICE: TEN YEARS OF PEACEMAKING IN THE DRC 16
(2009).
36. See generally Global and Inclusive Agreement, supra note 25.
37. Id. § 111.8; The amnesty was formalized by Presidential Decree in 2003, and
passed by the legislature in 2005. DR Congo Parliament Backs-Amnesty, BBC NEWS, Nov.
30 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hilafrica/4485916.stm.
38. Global and Inclusive Agreement, supra note 25, § 111.8.
39. Prospects for Justice, supra note 24.
40. BORELLO, supra note 8, at 24.
41. DAVIS & HAYNER,supra note 35, at 16.
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reconciliation commissions have been effective accountability and
reconciliation bodies in a number of contexts, 4 2 the Global
Agreement's commitment to the commission was cosmetic at best.
The full text of the commitment can be found under Article V's
listing of Transitional Institutions, which stipulates that a number
of "institutions supporting democracy shall be set up," among
them "The Truth and Reconciliation Commission." 4 3 As a result of
the vague wording, the substance of .the Commission's mandate
and structure was left to be decided by the very parties the TRC
would investigate. Thus, the TRC was "constrained from the start
by its composition," as the inclusion of groups "known to have
committed egregious human rights abuses" created a clear conflict
44of interest that stymied an effective commission. The TRC bided
its time for several years before quietly endin6 in June 2006."* In
that time, it did not investigate a single case. The Agreement
does not mention any other accountability mechanism, nor does it
mention accountability for past human rights atrocities at any
point.
The combination of power sharing -without vetting gross
human rights violators - and little more than hypothetical
accountability measures reflected the negotiating parties' primary
interest in achieving an immediate peace. As Jason Stearns, a well-
respected Congo analyst, concluded, "[i]n contrast with peace
processes elsewhere, justice and reconciliation have ranked low on
the list of priorities in Congo."47
IV. FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO THE Low PRIORITY GIVEN TO
JUSTICE
This section argues that four interwoven factors contributed
to the low priority assigned to justice in the Final Act and
Transition: (1) the staggering human toll of the conflict; (2) the
lack of political will of the negotiating parties; (3) the weakness of
42. For a good discussion of the role of truth and reconciliation commissions in, inter
alia, South Africa, Argentina, El Salvador, and Chile, see PRISCILLA B. HAYNER,
UNSPEAKABLE TRUTHS: CONFRONTING STATE TERROR AND ATROCITY 32-45 (2001).
43. Global and Inclusive Agreement, supra note 25, § V.
44. DAVIS & HAYNER,supra note 35 at 21.
45. Id. at 22.
46. Id.
47. Stearns, supra note 6, at 205.
2010] 217
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the central state; and (4) the lack of international community
interest.
First, the human toll of the conflict in the Congo was utterly
overwhelming. The numbers speak for themselves. Between 1998
and 2004, nearly four million people died. 48 Most of these deaths
resulted from disease and hunger, as low-level violence cut off
basic services and displaced millions.4 9 The total breakdown of
security left human rights at the mercy of bands of marauders. It
would be difficult to overstate the extent of the horrors inflicted on
the population of the Congo at the time of the Final Act.
The terror left the country in a state of profound war fatigue.
Prior to and during the negotiations, commentators found war
fatigue to be a reason for hope. A September 2003 report listed
first among its "Sources of Optimism" the fact that "war fatigue
leads the overwhelming majority of Congolese to profoundly
yearn for an end to the horridly deadly conflict.",o As early as
1999, UN Humanitarian Coordinator Darioush Bayandor claimed
that war fatigue had already set in and that "[p]eople in all parts
of the DRC ... cry out for peace. "51
While war fatigue may well promote conflict resolution by
readying parties for compromise, it seems intuitive that
negotiations under the stress of war fatigue will encourage short-
term solutions. This was the case in the Congo. With thousands
dying,52 thousands more raped each day, 5 blood on the hands of all
parties, and no end in sight, the incentives to focus on ending the
violence at all costs were enormous. Accountability for yesterday's
atrocities seemed less important than preventing those of today
and tomorrow. While this is a classic situation in which "the
prerogatives of peacemaking collide with the prerogatives of
achieving justice for violations of the human person in times of
48. Coughlan et al., supra note 2, at 49.
49. Id. at 44, 50.
50. EMERIC ROGIER, REPORT ON ISS INT'L EXPERT WORKSHOP: MONUC AND
THE CHALLENGES OF PEACE IMPLEMENTATION IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF
CONGO 2 (Sep. 2003).
51. Press Release, UN Humanitarian Coordinator, UN Humanitarian Missions
Behind the Ceasefire Line (Oct. 10, 1999), available at
http://www.africa.upenn.edulHornet/irin_101299.html.
52. James Astill, The Land Where Rape Is an Everyday Horror, THE GUARDIAN
(U.K.), May 18, 2002, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2002/may/18/jamesastill.
53. Id.
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war,"54 the scale of the daily human toll in the Congo produced a
need to simply end the conflict as soon as possible. A good faith
desire to bring justice to human rights violators could easily be
subsumed by the enormity of the consequences of delaying peace.
Second, the parties around the negotiating table simply did
not have the will to make justice a part of the negotiations. Put
plainly, the negotiating parties did not prioritize justice in the
peace process for fear of being subjected to prosecution
themselves. Representatives of the government, army, RCD,
MLC, and other armed groups had good reason to fear effective
accountability measures-each had a substantial amount of blood
on its hands. An International Center for Transitional Justice
report summarized the extent of culpability:
Many, if not all, sides to the conflict have regularly
employed the tactic of murdering, raping, maiming, and
terrorizing civilians. Most rebels have engaged in
continued recruitment of child soldiers; rape and sexual
violence is. commonplace; horrendous acts like
cannibalism, mutilation, and the burying of live people
have been reported over the years by Congolese and
international organizations. The consequences for
Congolese society have been devastating.
The negotiating parties, then, had little interest in holding
themselves accountable. They had every incentive to deemphasize
justice in the peace process.
Third, the weakness of the central state meant that, even if
the political will could be summoned, accountability measures
would-likely be impossible to achieve. Government forces were in
the unenviable position of negotiating without a credible military
threat. The Congolese army, acting without the support of more
professional regional powers, was "simply not up to the task of
imposing the authority of the government," forcing the
government to "fall back on alliances with local warlords."5 1
Mobutu's legacy included an army with a divided and overlapping
54. Jos6 E. Arvelo, International Law and Conflict Resolution in Columbia: Balancing
Peace and Justice in the Paramilitary Demobilization Process, 37 GEO. J. INT'L L. 411, 413
(2006).
55. BORELLO, supra note 8, at 13.
56. John Rapley, Op-Ed., Congo's Civil War, THE JAMAICA GLEANER, June 26,
2003, available at http://www.jamaica-gleaner.com/gleaner/20030626/cleisure/
cleisure2.html.
2010] 219
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
command structure, a product of a shifting system of patronage
designed to ward off threats of coups." Both Laurent and Joseph
Kabila relied heavily on a small presidential guard for their own
security,. leaving the army weak, underfinanced, and. largely
untrained. The International Crisis Group described government
security forces as "emasculated," hamstrung by "confusion on the
army's role, weak police, negligible civilian oversight, tribalism,
unequal treatment, [and] rampant corruption."' 9 Joseph Kabila
had little reason to put faith in his security forces; his presidency
was the direct result of his father's relatively easy defeat of the
Congolese Army only a few years before.o Furthermore, the main
rebel groups had effectively run vast portions of the country
throughout the conflict, in defiance of state authority. Negotiating
without a viable stick, the government was in no position to insist
on or enforce accountability measures even if it desired to do so.
Fourth, the international community did not show the interest
or commitment necessary to counteract these powerful factors, as
it pushed for immediate peace at the expense of justice. While the
international community played a positive role in brokering the
peace deal, it failed to use its position as broker to push for robust
accountability measures as a component of the peace and
transition. Faced with a daunting diplomatic task in negotiating a
peace agreement, the international community was primarily
concerned with securing a peace that would lessen the conflict's
threat to regional stability. Human Rights Watch characterized the
international community's approach: "Having spent much effort
trying to end the war in the DRC, and satisfied with the
withdrawal of foreign troops and Congo's disavowal of Rwandan
rebels, the international community appeared willing to mute its
calls for accountability in hopes of ensuring the hard-won
semblance of stability."
57. INT'L CRISIS GROUP, AFRICA REPORT NO. 104,.SECURITY SECTOR REFORM IN
THE CONGO 2 (Feb. 13, 2006), available at http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/
index.cfm?id=3946.
58. Id. at 3.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 2.
61. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT 2003 28 (2003), available at
http://www.hrw.org/wr2k3/africa3.html.
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While the U.S., EU, and UN called for an end to human
62
rights abuses, none made accountability for past human rights
abuses a priority in pursuing peace. Each focused on ending the
61war immediately by de-prioritizing accountability, calls for which
might well have delayed or derailed the emerging peace
agreement. Absent a voice in the international community for
accountability measures, there was no strong advocate for justice
as an integral part of the peace agreement and transition.
The combination of these factors left the initial peace
agreement without mechanisms in place to pursue accountability
and justice. Overwhelming war fatigue and the culpability of all
parties for gross human rights violations meant that without a
strong voice in the negotiations pushing for justice, accountability
was likely to be left out of the agreement. The central government
was unlikely to insist on accountability measures for fear of
exposing its own soldiers and senior government officials to
prosecution. Even if given the political will, the government lacked
the military strength necessary to enforce the issue. The
international community, viewing an end to immediate hostilities
as the best realistic outcome, set aside accountability in the peace
negotiations. These factors together precipitated a peace
agreement and transitional structure that allowed for total
impunity for egregious human rights violations.
V. THE LEGACY OF THE TRANSITION
This paper does not argue that justice ought to have played a
larger role in the initial peace agreement and transition, nor does it
argue that the agreement appropriately balanced peace and
justice. It is neutral on this issue. The purpose of the preceding
section was to explain how impunity has been imbedded in the
peace process and transition, so as to understand the sources and
strength of the structures contributing to impunity for human
rights abuses in the DRC today. Each of the four factors that
caused justice to be assigned such a low priority in the transition
continues to be relevant today. While the transition and
subsequent peace agreements may have produced favorable
changes in the short term, the DRC must break away from its
62. Id. at 28-31.
63.. See id. at 28.
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strategy of buying peace if it is to find a lasting solution to the
conflict.
The peace agreement and transitional government produced
favorable results in the short-term. It was fairly successful in
64achieving its primary goal-a short-term cessation of hostilities.
A national army was created, and security in many areas of the
country improved dramatically.65 Critically, security was good
enough to allow for surprisingly fair and incident-free elections in
2006, giving the Congo its first democratically elected government
since independence. Elections, the top priority of the
international community throughout the peace process, produced
a decisive victory for Joseph Kabila-who won 58% of the vote-
and his alliances, which won a clear majority in parliament, the
upper house of the national legislature, and most of the provincial
governorships.68 For the first time since 1965, the DRC had an
elected government with a popular mandate, and a hope of
establishing a stable, functioning state.
Tragically, however, violence escalated in the eastern region
of the Congo, particularly in North and South Kivu, exacting a
69horrific toll on an.already desperate population. It appears that
the strategy of the negotiations-purchasing peace and promoting
human rights violators to positions of power-has continued
throughout the transition and into the post-election DRC.'0 In
2005, the government struck a deal with rebel leaders in the war-
torn Ituri district, in which six were named to the rank of general
in the newly integrated Congolese army and thirty-two others were
named to other senior ranks such as colonels, lieutenant-colonels,
64. See Stearns, supra note 6, at 202.
65. Id.
66. Jeffrey Gettleman, Congo Votes in Its First Multiparty Election in 46 Years, N.Y.
TIMES, July 31, 2006, at A3.
67. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, ELECTIONS IN SIGHT: "DON'T ROCK THE BOAT"? 17
(Dec. 15, 2005), available at http://www.hrw.org/legacy/backgrounderlafricaldrcl2051
drcl205.pdf.
68. INT'L CRISIS GROUP, AFRICA BRIEFING NO. 44, CONGO: STAYING ENGAGED
AFTER THE ELECTIONS 1 (Jan. 9 2007), http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/
index.cfm?id=4604&l=1; Stearns, supra note 6, at 202.
69. See e.g. Jeffrey Gettleman, Rape Epidemic Raises Trauma of Congo War, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 7, 2007, at Al [hereinafter Rape Epidemic Raises Trauma of Congo War].
70. See Stearns, supra note 6, at 207.
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71and majors. Among these were some of the "most notorious
human rights offenders in the country,",2 including Germaine
Katanga, who would later be indicted by the ICC and is awaiting a
73September trial in the Hague. Another round of army
appointments with amnesty took place in 2006, 1 and again in
November 2007."
The same pattern continues today, most notably in the case of
the leadership of the Congress for Defense of the People (CNDP).
In early 2007, Laurent Nkunda-widely agreed to be responsible
76for appalling crimes against humanity in the Kivus -agreed to an
amnesty deal and an appointment as a general in the Congolese
army, in exchange for a ceasefire and the integrations of his troops,
though the deal quickly broke down.n Exposure of the Rwandan
government's years of support for the CNDP,78 along with
Nkunda's increasingly bizarre behavior and calls for the overthrow
of Kabila, made him an "embarrassment and a liability" to the
79Rwandan regime and paved the way for his arrest. In a
71. D.R. Congo: Army Should Not Appoint War Criminals, HUM.RTS. WATCH, Jan.
13, 2005, http://hrw.org/english/docs/2005/01/14/congo10O14.htm.
72. Stearns, supra note 6, at 205.
73. Press Release, ICC, Trial of Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui to
Commence Thursday, 24 September 2009 (Mar. 27, 2009).
74. Last Ituri Warlord Signs Peace Deal in DRC, INDEPENDENT ONLINE, November
29, 2006,
http://www.iol.co.za/index.php?set-id=1&click -id=136&artid=iolll64801638331L233.
75. DRC: Sixteen Ituri Warlords Give Up the Fight, INTEGRATED REGIONAL
INFORMATION NETWORKS, (Nov. 6, 2007), http://www.irinnews.org/
Report.aspx?Reportld=75168.
76. See, e.g., D.R. Congo: Arrest Laurent Nkunda for War Crimes, HUM.RTS.
WATCH, Feb.1, 2006, http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2006/02/01/dr-congo-arrest-laurent-
nkunda-war-crimes (describing how Nkunda's troops killed, raped, and looted the
property of civilians); INT'L CRISIS GROUP, AFRICA REPORT NO. 91, THE CONGO'S
TRANSITION IS FAILING: CRISIS IN THE KIvus 6 (Mar. 30, 2005) (describing how
Nkunda's forces indiscriminately raped and murdered civilians when taking Bukavu in
2004); The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on Children and Armed
Conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo, 1 8, delivered to the Security Council and the
General Assembly, U.N. Doc. S/2007/391 (June 28, 2007) (describing the "disastrous
humanitarian consequences" in North Kivu because of frequent outbreaks of fighting.).
77. Id. at 11.
78. Although the CNDP was officially founded in December 2006, it was no more
than a rebranding of the RDC previously led by Laurent Nkunda. Consequently, I use the
name CNDP throughout the article because it is the most up to date name of the Tutsi
rebels formerly under the command of Laurent Nkunda, but may in places be referencing
what was at the time known as the RDC.
79. See id.; See also Jeffrey Gettleman, Rwanda Stirs Deadly Brew of Troubles in
Congo, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 2008, at A6; Julian Borger, Rwandan and Congolese
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
"fantastically cynical move," however, the Rwandan and
Congolese government's collaborated with and promoted Bosco
Ntaganda, Nkunda's former chief of staff who had been indicted
80by the ICC for war crimes, in order to facilitate the arrest. In a
joint news conference on January 16, 2009, Ntaganda stood side by
side with the Congolese minister of the interior and the head of
the police, and announced the CNDP would join the Congolese
and Rwandan armies in. operations to fight the Forces
Democratiques de Liberation du Rwanda (FDLR). ' As a part of
the deal, Ntaganda was given "money from Kinshasa,
encouragement from Kigali and a guarantee that the Congo would
grant him amnesty and protect him against International Criminal
Court (ICC) prosecution." 8 2 The DRC's minister for justice quietly
went to The Hague to inquire about having Ntaganda's arrest
warrant suspended, and Innocent Kayina, Ntaganda's compatriot
being held in Kinshasa for war crimes, was released.8 ' Rwanda and
the DRC-both of which are obligated by law to arrest Ntaganda
and turn him over to the ICC8- as well as MONUC now work so
closely with Ntaganda that "[j]ournalists report seeing documents
85referring to him as deputy co-ordinator" of military operations.
In this context, Nkunda's arrest and possible prosecution appears
to be a product of circumstance, rather than a fundamental shift in
policy. The strategy of purchasing peace and promoting human
rights violators continues.
Such a strategy was effective in paving a path towards an
elected government, but its potential to produce a long-term peace
in the Congo is highly doubtful. The policy of "containment,
Authorities Fuelling Humanitarian Disaster, Warns Major UN Report, THE GUARDIAN
(U.K.), Dec. 13, 2008, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/dec/13/congo-rwanda-
militias-united-nations.
80. Congo's Dangerous Crossroads, ENOUGH, Jan. 30, 2009,
http://www.enoughproject.org/publications/congos-dangerous-crossroads.
81. DR Congo: Arrest Bosco Ntaganda, HUM. RTS. WATCH, Feb. 2, 2009,
http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2009/02/02/dr-congo-arrest-bosco-ntaganda.
82. INT'L CRISIS GROUP, AFRICA REPORT NO. 150, CONGO: FIVE PRIORITIES FOR A
PEACEBUILDING STRATEGY 7-8 (May 11, 2009) [hereinafter CONGO: FIVE PRIORITIES
FOR A PEACEBUILDING STRATEGY].
83. Id. at 8.
84. Congo's Dangerous Crossroads, supra note 80.
85. Antonis Papasolomontos, Violence Brings Reward in the DRC, THE GUARDIAN
(U.K.), May 5, 2009, http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2009/may/05/congo-war-
crimes.
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appeasement, and international emphasis on the holding of
elections pursued during the transition is not a recipe for a
stable peace; it is a recipe for perpetual blackmail of the
government in Kinshasa. Dissatisfied groups understand that if
they are sufficiently violent and troublesome, they will be
rewarded- with high-level appointments in the Congolese
government or army. This strategy incentivizes brutality. Without
a change in tactics, the state is doomed to be held eternally hostage
by a series of belligerents seeking power and prosperity.
VI. THE CNDP, THE FDLR, AND THE CASE FOR INTERNATIONAL
ACCOUNTABILITY
The -persistent failure .of the peace process in the eastern
Congo to date makes clear that a change in strategy is required to
secure a stable peace. The rules of the game in the eastern Congo,
which has been so well established after years of containing and
appeasing belligerents, must be changed. Ending the culture.of
impunity through the arrest and trial of prominent rebel leaders in
the Kivus in the ICC would be such a change, and, it would also
create an opportunity for peace. While accountability itself is not a
panacea, here, in the particular case of the Congo, there is reason
to believe both (1) that puncturing the armor of impunity for
atrocities in the eastern Congo is a necessary step in securing a
long-term peace; and (2) accountability would have a deterrent
effect on belligerents in the region. This section will describe the
conflict in the Kivus in particular, argue for the imposition of
accountability as a necessary and positive contribution to the
peace process, and briefly defend the ICC as well suited to impose
accountability in the short-term.
A. The Conflict in the East
The conflict in the Kivus is the epicenter of instability in the
Congo. Like the broader conflict in the Congo, which eased
considerably after the final act and through the transition, the
fighting in North Kivu involves multiple armed groups, is rooted in
historical ethnic grievances, and is further complicated by the ever-
86. INT'L CRISIS GROUP, AFRICA REPORT NO. 133, CONGO: BRINGING PEACE TO
NORTH KIvu i (Oct. 31, 2007).
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changing goals of the parties involved.8 ' A brief sketch of the
particulars of the conflict in North Kivu today is provided below.
There are several armed groups operating in the East. The
CNDP, formerly led by Laurent Nkunda who is now under house
arrest in Rwanda has been fighting the Congolese Army since
December 2003. With the army too weak to defeat Nkunda
militarily, the civilian population bore the brunt of the deadlock. A
renewed offensive by the Congolese army (FARDC) in August
2008 led to the eventual rout of Congolese troops by the militarily
superior CNDP; CNDP marched to the outskirts of Goma, a
strategic lynchpin, before declaring a unilateral cease fire in late
October 2008.
The Congolese army's offensive did not rely exclusively on
regular FARDC troops, but it enlisted the assistance of FDLR, the
roughly 6,000 Hutu militiamen led by perpetrators of the Rwandan
genocide who fled into the Eastern Congo in 1994,9' and the Mayi-
92Mayi militias. The FDLR has been guilty of continued atrocities
93against Congolese Tutsis and other civiliaris since the genocide,
which provides the CNDP's stated raison d'etre, protecting the
eastern Congo's Tutsi population from further atrocities.9 The
continued fighting has created a "self-fulfilling prophecy [in which]
[e]very military offensive, with its abuses against innocent civilians,
fans the flames of [historical] anti-Tutsi sentiment," lending
credence to the CNDP's claim to be the protecting Congolese
Tutsis and the Banyarwanda community of East Congo from
87. See generally Human Rights Watch, Renewed Crisis in North Kivu, 19 HUM. RTS.
WATCH (2007) No. 17(A), available at http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/
reports/drc1007webwcover.pdf [hereinafter Renewed Crisis in North Kivu].
88. CONGO: FIVE PRIORITIES FOR A PEACEBUILDING STRATEGY, supra note 82, at
12.
89. CONGO: BRINGING PEACE TO NORTH KIvu, supra note 86, at 3.
90. CONGO: FIVE PRIORITIES FOR A PEACEBUILDING STRATEGY, supra note 82, at
2-3.
91. See Stephanie McCrummen, For Tutsis of Eastern Congo, Protector, Exploiter or
Both?, WASH. POST, Aug. 6, 2007, at A01.
92. CONGO: FIVE PRIORITIES FOR A PEACEBUILDING STRATEGY, supra note 82, at
2.
93. Renewed Crisis in North Kivu, supra note 87, at 3.
94. REBECCA FEELEY & COLIN THOMAS-JENSEN, BEYOND CRISIS MANAGEMENT
IN EASTERN CONGO 2 (2008), available at http://enoughproject.org/
files/publications/easterncongo1208.pdf.
95. The Banyarwanda are Kinyarwanda speaking peoples of Rwandan descent.
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mass murder. The Tutsi minority and the largely Hutu civilian
population of Eastern Congo each claim to require protection
from one another."
In a stunning reversal in January 2009, the Congolese
government struck a deal with Rwanda, which had been quietly
supporting the CNDP, to arrest Laurent Nkunda and collaborate
to hunt down its former allies, the FDLR.98 The CNDP's new
leadership, Bosco Ntaganda, declared his forces would fight the
FDLR alongside the FARDC.99 There followed a month long joint
operation involving 3,500-4,000 Rwandan troops on Congolese
soil, which dispersed, but did not destroy, the FDLR.'00 Following
Rwanda's withdrawal, the FDLR began retaking ground and
"taking revenge on communities it believes supported the joint
operation."'' The numbers of displaced persons continue to rise as
the returning FDLR commit atrocities including mass killings and
mass rapes against the population. Reprisal killings by the
FDLR are mirrored by the FARDC with "each accusing civilians
of supporting the other side."'O'
The dynamics of this conflict are constantly in flux, with an
array of shifting alliances and fluid objectives for each party. The
one constant in eastern Congo has been the "culture of impunity"
for the staggering human rights abuses committed by all parties to
the conflict. Abuses committed by all parties-the CNDP, the
FDLR, and the FARDC-are well documented.'
96. See CONGO: BRINGING PEACE TO NORTH Kivu, supra note 86, at 7-8. The report
notes the historic role of anti-Tutsi sentiment in Congolese politics, as well as calls by local
politicians for ethnic cleansing and extermination of the Tutsis and Banyarwanda,
including candidates in the run up to the 2006 elections proclaiming themselves the "cure
for Tutsi." CONGO: BRINGING PEACE TO NORTH KIVU, supra note 86, at 7, n.41.
97. Renewed Crisis in North Kivu, supra note 87, at 4.
98. Congo's Dangerous Crossroads, supra note 80.
99. CONGO: FIVE PRIORITIES FOR A PEACEBUILDING STRATEGY, supra note 82 at
7-8.
100. The Secretary General, Twenty-Seventh Report of the Secretary-General on the
United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 2-4, U.N.
Doc. S/2009/160 (Mar. 27, 2009) [hereinafter Twenty-Seventh Report].
101. CONGO: FIVE PRIORITIES FOR A PEACEBUILDING STRATEGY, supra note 82, at
i.
102. Papasolomontos, supra note 85.
103. DR Congo: 100,000 Civilians at Risk of Attack, supra note 4.
104. Id. at 3, 5, 13, 27, 35; Renewed Crisis in North Kivu, supra note 87, at 58-63.
105. See Renewed Crisis in North Kivu, supra note 87, at 24-56.
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B. The Case for Accountability
The strategic change most likely to break the stalemate and
create the conditions for a lasting peace is ending the culture of
impunity through the arrest and trial of prominent rebel leaders in
the eastern Congo. Two lines of analysis support this argument.
First, given that ethnic based human rights violations in the Kivus
are a key driver of the conflict, there is reason to believe that
establishing accountability for those most responsible for atrocities
is a necessary condition for peace in the region. Second, the
imposition of accountability would have a positive deterrent effect
on human rights violators, which would contribute to prospects for
a lasting peace.
The history of impunity for ethnic-based human rights
violations drives the. current conflict in the Kivus, and "([t]he
glaring absence of accountability for crimes against humanity
continues to fuel conflict in eastern Congo." 06 There is reason to
believe that a stable peace in eastern Congo cannot be achieved
without establishing some form of accountability for human rights
atrocities committed by the FDLR and Hutu extremists. The
CNDP's strength lies in positioning itself as the protector of the
Tutsi minority in eastern Congo, a position that stems directly
from impunity for human rights violations on the part of Hutu
extremists and the FDLR. The wealthy Tutsi business community
has historically supported the CNDP because it saw it as "their last
bulwark of protection" in the Kivus, without whom the Tutsis of
107
Congo would face "a time-bomb" in the form of Hutu militias.
Laurent Nkunda's propaganda and recruitment campaigns
explicitly relied on past atrocities, including distributing images
and videos of Tutsis being burned and killed in Kinshasa and
Bukavu.'os With such atrocities going unpunished, the CNDP's
claims to be the last line of defense against imminent genocide
resonate with Congolese Tutsis, particularly among the disaffected
populations in Rwandan refugee camps. The arrest and trial of
prominent leaders of the Hutu militias most responsible for human
rights abuses against the Tutsi minority would drastically undercut
106. FEELEY & THOMAS-JENSEN, supra note 94, at 8.
107. See Renewed Crisis in North Kivu, supra note 87, at 13. These quotes come from
interviews with prominent businessmen and local leaders of the Tutsi community.
108. Id. at 7, n.44.
109. Id.
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the CNDP's support structure. Having been soundly routed by the
CNDP in late 2008, the government in Kinshasa has taken a key
step towards peace by teaming with Rwanda to address the
CNDP's reason for existing, the FDLR.no But a purely militaristic
approach to the FDLR is not a sound strategy. It is unlikely to be
successful, as evidenced by the FDLR's recent retaking of ground
in the Kivus,"' will not address the simmering ethnic tensions in
the Congo nor persuade the Tutsi population that the Congolese
government is serious about protecting them from ethnic violence.
The arrest and trial of FDLR and Hutu extremist leaders most
responsible for human rights abuses would deny the CNDP its
most potent weapon: the perceived righteousness of its cause
among the Tutsi community.
Similarly, a lasting peace is unlikely without the arrest and
trial of the CNDP's leadership, including Bosco Ntaganda and
Laurent Nkunda, for human rights atrocities. The CNDP has
enjoyed "almost absolute" impunity, which has "contributed
dangerously to tensions between communities."" 2 Though Nkunda
has been arrested, it is not clear whether he will be tried, 1 3 and
even if he were, equally culpable CNDP leadership continue to
enjoy impunity. Bosco Ntaganda, whose ICC indictment was
unsealed in April 2008, "now holds a key position in the eastern
114command structure of the army." Even in the context of a
particularly brutal war, the CNDP men "have distinguished
themselves" as human rights violators among the local
population."' Suspecting "all non-Tutsi" of collaborating with the
FDLR and Hutu militiamen, they have been given free reign to
exact a terrible toll on the local population."6 They have
117indiscriminately murdered and abducted civilians, employed
110. CONGO: FIVE PRIORITIES FOR A PEACEBUILDING STRATEGY, supra note 82, at
2.
111. Rebels 'retake Congo positions,' BBC NEWS, Mar. 1, 2009,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hilafrica/7918038.stm.
112. CONGO: FIVE PRIORITIES FOR A PEACEBUILDING STRATEGY, supra note 82, at
4.
113. Id. at 12-13.
114. Joe Bavier, Congo passes amnesty law for eastern rebels REUTERS, May 7, 2009,
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSL71023868._CH_.2400.
115. McCrummen, supra note 91.
116. CONGO: BRINGING PEACE TO NORTH KIvU, supra note 89, at 7.
117. DR Congo: Civilians in Peril, HUM.RTS. WATCH, Oct. 23, 2007,
http://www.hrw.orgl en/news/2007/10/21/dr-congo-civilians-peril.
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systematic rape of the population as a weapon of war, and
looted widely both for personal gain and to punish the population
for supporting the FDLR."' Over a million people have been
displaced from their homes, 20 with the CNDP seen as the chief
cause of their suffering. Though the recent amnesty provision
121passed by the DRC for "acts of war," which excludes war crimes,
was probably necessary, the local population would be unlikely to
acquiesce to any peace deal that denies them some semblance of
justice. The leadership of the CNDP must be held accountable.
This argument is more than just intuitive; it is historically
grounded. Indeed, an outraged civilian population played a large
part in derailing Nkunda's January 2007 amnesty deal with the
government.122 The International Crisis Group reported that local
communities "which had suffered at the hands of Nkunda's men"
were outraged, while across the country, "citizens, who had been
told for years that Nkunda was the main public enemy, a Rwandan
puppet and the chief author of the. massacres in the East, also
123looked with suspicion at the peace." Remarkably, the nascent
civil society rose to the task, with a public outcry that prompted
"outraged articles in Kinshasa's press" and "[f]iery speeches by
local and national politicians."124 While there are several possible
125
explanations for why the agreement broke down, there can be no
doubt that the public's response to the perceived unfairness of a
peace deal without accountability measures for Nkunda played a
part in derailing the deal. In fact, following Nkunda's arrest, the
118. CONGO: BRINGING PEACE TO NORTH Kivu, supra note 89, at 5; see also Rape
Epidemic Raises Trauma of Congo War, supra note 69.
119. Renewed Crisis in North Kivu, supra note 87, at 37.
120. Twenty-Seventh Report, supra note 100, at 5.
121. See Amnesty Law for DR Congo Militias, BBC NEWS, May 7, 2009,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/8037891.stm.
122. See CONGO: BRINGING PEACE TO NORTH KIVU, supra note 86, at 9-10. While
the terms of the deal are not fully known, it is suspected that they included an amnesty
provision and integration of Nkunda's troops with the into mixed brigades.
123. Id. at 9.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 10. Other factors might have included the ambiguity of the terms, the lack of
real commitment on either side, and the lack of an outreach campaign to inform the
populace of the terms and assuage its fears.
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population in North Kivu demanded his extradition to the DRC to
face trial. 2 6
More speculative, but historically grounded as well, is the risk
that further violence and reprisal killings will take place against
Tutsi communities if CNDP senior leadership is not held
accountable, continuing the cycle of ethnic violence.'27 Even if the
local community had not reacted violently to Ntaganda's
participation in the army and Nkunda's uncertain future, the
history of Tutsi persecution in the Kivus suggests that local and
national politicians will use these cases to fan the flames of anti-
Tutsi sentiment for political gain. In fact, this process began to
take place in 2000, during the initial peace deal. Hard-line
Congolese nationalists criticized the deal, somewhat counter-
intuitively, for pulling the Kivus back into Rwanda's-and its
Tutsi-led government's-"sphere of influence." The history of
ethnic-based conflict in the region, and the immediate turn to
stirring up anti-Tutsi sentiment in response to a rumored amnesty
deal for senior CNDP leader Nkunda, suggests that a lasting peace
is unattainable without some measure of accountability in the
. region.
The second line of analysis supporting the imposition of
accountability is that it will deter future violence and human rights
abuses in the Kivus. There has been substantial scholarly debate as
to the deterrent value of international criminal law in general and
of the International Criminal Court in particular, especially after
the hi 1 profile indictment of Sudanese president Omar Al
Bashir. Critics argue that proponents "have not a shred of
126. Peter Clottey, Kinshasa and Kigali Hold Talks Over Extradition of Rebel Leader,
VOICE OF AMERICA NEWS, Feb. 6, 2009, http://wwwl.voanews.comlenglish/news/a-13-
2009-02-06-voa5-68823297.html.
127. See CONGO: BRINGING PEACE TO NORTH KIvU, supra note 86, at 8 (outlining
the anti-Tutsi sentiment and the threat to the community as a whole).
128. Id. at 9.
129. See generally Nick Grono, Deterring Future Darfurs, REUTERS, Mar. 4, 2009,
http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2009/03/04/deterring-future-darfurs/; David
Wippman, Atrocities, Deterrence, and the Limits of International Justice, 23 FORDHAM
INT'L L.J. 473 (1999) (arguing that the connection between international criminal
accountability and deterrence of atrocities is at best hypothetical); Payam Akhavan,
Beyond Impunity: Can International Criminal Justice Prevent Future Atrocities?, 95 AM. J.
INT'L L. 7 (2001) (arguing that the imposition of international accountability through
international tribunals and the ICC has begun to constrain potential criminal conduct); see
also Nick Grono & Adam O'Brien, Justice in Conflict? The ICC and Peace Processes, in
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evidence supporting their deterrence theories."130 This article's
purpose is not, however, to resolve this complicated debate in the
general case. Instead it argues only that there is reason to believe
that in the particular case of eastern Congo, imposition of
accountability via the ICC would contribute meaningfully to the
peace process by deterring human rights atrocities.
There is historic evidence to suggest that the ICC is capable
of deterring, at least to some degree, Congolese rebel groups from
committing human rights abuses constituting international crimes.
As early as 2004, when the DRC Government first referred its case
to the Court, 3 ' the International Center for Transitional Justice
wrote that "there seems to be a growing consensus that the ICC
should remain engaged in the DRC and that it could play a
positive role in the peace process by breaking the cycle of impunity
and acting as a deterrent." Indeed, the Congolese Minister for
Human Rights noted that "[t]he announcement by the
[P]rosecutor that he is considering bringing his first case in the
Congo had a pronounced deterrent effect on the action of armed
groups. in Ituri [in northeastern Congo]."133 MONUC's human
rights division noted that "the significant attention being paid to
the ICC was having a deterrent effect in Ituri."13 4 While these
statements are strong evidence of the impact of the ICC on the
ground in the Congo, critics will point out that violence continued
in Ituri following the initial indictments, and dismiss as misguided
optimism the comments from the government, NGOs, and the
UN.
COURTING CONFLICT? JUSTICE, PEACE AND THE ICC IN AFRICA 13 (Nicolas Waddell &
Phil Clark eds., 2008).
130. John R. Bolton, Under Sec'y for Arms Control and Int'l Sec., The United States
and the International Criminal Court, Remarks to the Federalist Society (Nov. 14, 2002)
(transcript available at http://www.2001-2009.state.gov/t/us/rm/15158.htm).
131. The ICC issued a press release discussing the referral of the case on April 19,
2004. The Prosecutor issued a press release discussing the opening of the investigation on
June 23, 2004. ICC 01/04 - Updates - Democratic Republic of the Congo, http://www.icc-
cpi.int/menus/icc/situations%20and%20cases/situations/situation%20icc%20010 4/recent%
20updates?lan=en-GB.
132. BORELLO, supra note 8, at 31.
133. Anthony Deutsch, Congolese Human Rights Minister: New Criminal Court Deters
Tribal Warfare, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Jan. 22, 2004, http://www.publicinternationallaw.org/
docs/PNW/PNW.26Jan_04.htm (emphasis added).
134. William W. Burke-White, Complementarity in Practice: The International
Criminal Court as Part of a System of Multi-level Global Governance in the Democratic
Republic of Congo, 18 LEIDEN J. INT'L. L. 557, 589 (2005).
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However, more difficult to dismiss are the words of the
Congolese rebels themselves. This article relies heavily on William
Burke-White's October 2003 interviews with rebel leaders in Ituri,
which took place approximately a month and a half after the ICC
first announced the opening of its investigation. These interviews
indicate that "the ICC investigation is altering the thinking and
possibly the behavior of criminal actors." 13  While the
methodology is imperfect, 36 statements by the rebels themselves
are strong evidence of the deterrent value of the ICC.
Several rebels reported that the Court's investigation was
changing behavior in Ituri. The testimony of Thomas Lubanga,
currently on trial before the ICC,13 is the most useful in fleshing
out what the abstract notion of deterrence might mean on the
ground in the Congo. Ituri stated, "the Court has been a pressure
on the political actors who were killing people ... these people are
very afraid today to commit such slaughter." 138 He also claimed
that "there is a palpable pressure not to do certain things' and
'those responsible are now very worried."' 39 In addition, Lubanga
asked for a copy of the Rome Statute in French to go over with his
lawyer,140 further evidence that he was aware of and concerned by
his potential exposure for "slaughter." Though it is not clear if
Lubanga was speaking of the Court's deterring his own behavior
or that of rebels in Ituri generally, Burke-White rightly points out
that in either case "for one of the principle suspects of
international crimes in the region to be actively interested in the
text of the Rome Statute and to claim the Court was altering the
135. Id. at 560-561.
136. Id. Burke-White notes several methodological problems; the small sample size, as
only a few perpetrators agreed to be interviewed; the risk that interviewees would alter
their statements in anticipation of indictments and prosecutions; and the myriad factors
that might account for the reduction in major crime in Ituri, making it impossible to prove
a statistically meaningful causal link between the ICC investigation and the reduction in
atrocities. Nonetheless, "statements by perpetrators that the ICC has been causal of their
behavior change" are the best and most direct evidence available.
137. Marlise Simons, After Delays, Court Begins Congo Trial in The Hague, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 27, 2009, at A10; Marlese Simons, "International Court Begins First Trial",
New York Times, January 26 2009.
138. Burke-White, supra note 134, at 587.
139. Id.
140. Id.
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behaviour of suspected criminals is, at the very least,
noteworthy." ...
Furthermore, Lubanga's statements are corroborated by the
actions of Xavier Ciribanya, a former RCD rebel appointed
Governor of South Kivu in the transition, whose bodyguards
turned in arms to the UN Mission.14 2 Though he questioned the
ability of the court to arrest indicted offenders and wondered "if
this Court will be stronger than [the government in] Kinshasa,"
Ciribanya claimed that "[w]e all now are thinking twice. We do not
know what this Court can and will do."143 This statement is
noteworthy for two reasons. First it indicates that the mere
prospect of investigation by the ICC has led rebels in Ituri to at
least consider the relationship between their actions and a possible
trial in the ICC; and second, it indicates that the deterrent value of
the Court will be enhanced by effective prosecution of crimes in
the region-that is, when the Court shows what it "can and will
do." As the court grows stronger and gains a track record of
144convictions in the Congo, its deterrent value will only increase.
The evidence from the Government, NGOs, the UN, and
rebels themselves suggests that the ICC investigation of crimes in
Ituri was noticed by rebel groups and had at least some impact on
their behavior. While it is not entirely clear what impact ICC
deterrence had on the ground in Ituri,145 the statement by Lubanga
141. Id. at 587-588.
142. DR of Congo: UN Mission Helps Restore Calm to Bukavu, UN News Service, Feb.
10, 2004, http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewslD=9725&Cr=democratic&Crl=
congo&Kwl=restore+calm&Kw2=&Kw3=#.
143. Burke-White, supra note 134, at 588.
144. See Grono & O'Brien, supra note 129, at 14. (arguing that when the ICC secures
convictions its credibility and deterrent value will be enhanced).
145. To the extent that direct evidence is not available, it is worth considering ICC
deterrence in the context of Abram Chayes', The Cuban Missile Crisis: International Crisis
and the Role of Law (1974). Chayes argues that in the Cuban Missile Crisis "[1]egal
considerations -like military or diplomatic or political considerations-operated on
decision not directly, but mediately, filtered through the different purposes, perspectives,
and susceptibilities of the players in the central game." Id. at 30. Here, while not a crisis
situation, the imposition of legal accountability might operate as one of several
considerations playing into a rebel's decision regarding tactics to be used in his insurgency.
Chayes' article might also respond to the argument that violence has continued, to some
degree, in Ituri and elsewhere in spite of continued investigation and several indictments.
He points out that "even if conduct violates a relatively determinate legal standard, it does
not necessarily follow that the action was unaffected by the law. Do we believe that the
behaviour of a man travelling 65 miles an hour on a super-highway with a 60-miles-speed-
limit was not constrained by law?" Id. at 26. Even if accountability does not end atrocities
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that those who were killing people are hesitant to commit such
slaughter today for fear of the ICC is excellent-albeit anecdotal-
evidence of the ICC as a direct deterrent to "slaughter" of
civilians. The impact of the ICC's investigation in Ituri suggests
that the imposition of accountability in the Kivus would have a
similar deterrent effect.14
C. The International Criminal Court
This paper has argued that the imposition of accountability
through the arrest and trial of prominent rebel leaders in the Kivus
would be a positive step for the peace process. While the ICC is
not the only possible accountability mechanism-and it is the
imposition of fair accountability in any form that is important-it
is the most plausible source of immediate justice. It is quite
possible that the there may be a better vehicle for establishing fair
accountability, but such an inquiry is beyond the subject of this
paper.147 A broad discussion of some issues to consider in choosing
an accountability mechanism follows, supporting the ICC route as
a sound choice.
Domestic accountability, even if desirable, is impossible in the
short term. While the DRC seeks the extradition of Nkunda to be
tried in the Congol4 and Rwandan and Congolese government's
continue to negotiate his transfer,14 9 the Congolese judicial system
is not capable of delivering fair and impartial justice in the short
term. The "justice sector is unable to deliver day-to-day rule of law
for the population, let alone tackle massive rights abuses" and its
in their entirety, a draw down in the scope and scale of human rights abuses may be rooted
in to the cultivation of legal norms.
146. Critics who argue that the ICC's small case load prevents it from acting as a
general deterrent may well be right. However, the statements of Lubanga and Ciribanya
support the specific deterrent value of the ICC shining a spotlight on a particular region.
Ciribanya in particular stated "I hear they will go to Bunia [Ituri] first." Burke-White,
supra note 134, at 588 (suggesting rebels pay attention to the scope of the Court's
investigation).
147. For a good analysis of the challenges presented by the Congolese justice system
and the possible mechanisms of transitional justice, see generally BORELLO, supra note 8.
148. DR Congo Seeks Nkunda Extradition, BBC NEWS, Jan. 23, 2009,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7847639.stm.
149. James Karuhanga, DRC-Rwanda Justice Ministers Meet to Discuss Nkunda's Fate,
NEW TIMES (Rwanda), May 6, 2009, http://www.newtimes.co.rwl
index.php?issue=13887&article-15470.
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infrastructure has "collapsed almost completely."" 0 The domestic
legal system "suffers from an almost absolute lack of
independence from the executive" while "corruption seems to
dictate the outcome of most judicial proceedings."' Congolese
magistrates are "poorly trained, ill-equipped," and "not
independent," thus facing "serious problems in implementing laws
and delivering justice."' Bringing any suspect connected to the
Kabila government to trial would be an "enormous challenge"
given the "political interference" throughout the system.
Because the value of accountability for the peace process depends
on independence and objectivity, even the unlikely prospect of a
fair trial domestically would be undercut by the lack of credibility
of domestic courts. The assumption would be that the punishment
was a political act, rather than the cold and disimpassioned
imposition of justice. The value of accountability to the peace
process depends on its appearing non-negotiable and even handed.
The ICC is a good option for objective and credible justice.
International accountability, then, is essential in the short
term. While international accountability could take a number of
forms-perhaps a special tribunal or a hybrid court-each would
take a good deal of time to establish. The ICC, already active and
credible in the Congo, could have an immediate impact on the
peace process in the Kivus. It would not be necessary, or possible,
for the Court to prosecute. all human rights violations in the
region. Inevitably, "hard choices, given scarce resources" would
have to be made as to who bears the highest degree of
responsibility. 54 But prioritizing and immediately prosecuting
those most responsible for atrocities could deter further abuses
and break the cycle of violence, paving the way for a stable peace
addressing the underlying . causes of the conflict and
comprehensive reconciliation.
150. DAVIS & HAYNER, supra note 35, at 25.
151. BORELLO, supra note 8, at 24.
152. DAVIS &HAYNER, supra note 35, at 25.
153. Id. at 26.
154. BORELLO, supra note 8, at 16.
155. CONGO: BRINGING PEACE TO NORTH Kivu, supra note 86, at ii. In addition to
reconciliation and human rights issues, the Group notes the need to address many issues
to secure a comprehensive and lasting peace. They include land rights, refugee
repatriation, economic opportunity, inter-community relations, etc.
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VII. CONCLUSION
The conflict in the eastern Congo continues, subjecting an
already beleaguered population to further displacement, violence,
and human rights abuses. The strategy of appeasing human rights
violators with high-level government appointments has persisted
through the transition and into the present day, condemning the
DRC to a continuing cycle of violence with no end in sight. If a
lasting peace is possible, it will not be reached without a change in
tack. To continue on the current course is to resign ourselves to
the status quo-periods of conflict marked by mass displacement,
horrific human rights abuses and the risk of regional war, followed
by appointments in the government or army for those responsible.
This is a recipe for failure.
Ultimately, a stable peace . will require a comprehensive
approach that addresses the infinitely complicated root causes of
the conflict. There is no silver bullet, and the prospects for peace
are slim. But prosecuting rebels in the eastern Congo for abusing
human rights would be a valuable step in creating conditions
necessary to address the underlying causes of the conflict. Without
piercing the armor of impunity the prospects for a lasting peace
are not even slim-they are'non-existent.
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